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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Juan Roberto (Robert) Jimenez and his younger brother, Jorge 1 Alvarado, had 
been quarrelling with each other about various subjects for about a year. On 
February 9, 2013, the two had been arguing over the phone, Jorge drove over to 
Robert's residence and, during the confrontation that ensued on the street outside his 
house, Robert shot Jorge in the legs and lower back. Robert claimed that he shot Jorge 
in self-defense while Jorge claimed he posed no threat to his brother at the time of the 
shooting. After five hours of deliberations, the jury found Mr. Jimenez guilty of 
aggravated battery.2 
Mr. Jimenez asserts, as fundamental error, that the self-defense instruction the 
court gave was erroneous and essentially lowered the State's burden of proving the 
aggravated battery was unlawful, by telling the jurors that self-defense is not available 
unless the defendant is solely motivated to meet the danger presented. Mr. Jimenez 
further asserts, as fundamental error, that the prosecutor committed misconduct during 
closing arguments by misinforming the jurors that the objective "reasonable person 
standard" is defined by their own subjective belief as to what is reasonable. 
Mr. Jimenez also asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial 
1 Mr. Alvarado's first name is spelled J-o-r-g-e at times and G-e-o-r-g-e at other times in 
the transcript. For consistency purposes, Mr. Alvarado's first name will be spelled J-o-r-
~-e throughout this Brief. 
The jury also found Mr. Jimenez guilty of felon in possession of a firearm, found that 
he used a firearm during the commission of the aggravated battery, and, after part II of 
the jury trial, found he was a persistent violator of the law. Mr. Alvarado challenges only 
his conviction for aggravated battery which, if he is successful in this appeal, would also 
negate the use of a firearm enhancement. He does not challenge his felon in 
possession of a firearm conviction, nor the finding that he is a persistent violator of the 
law. 
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based upon newly discovered evidence that Mr. Alvarado told people after the shooting 
that Robert shot him because he was going to harm Robert. Finally, Mr. Jimenez 
asserts that his total unified sentence of 28, with 8 years fixed, is excessive in light of 
the mitigating factors that exist in his case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed an Amended Information charging Robert Jimenez with the 
crimes of aggravated battery and felon in possession of a firearm, and further alleged 
that he used a firearm during the commission of the aggravated battery and that he was 
a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.80-83.) During opening statements, defense 
counsel informed the jury that Mr. Jimenez did not dispute that he shot his brother, 
.Jorge Alvarado; rather, counsel asserted that Mr. Jimenez shot his brother in self-
defense. (Tr., p.107, L.6 - p.110, L.19.) 
Mr. Alvarado testified that he "didn't think it was right" when his older brother 
Robert started dating Nicole Brennan, who had previously dated their younger brother, 
Jose Ramirez, and he let the two of them know how he felt (Tr., p.156, L.24 p.161, 
L.8.) Ms. Brennan testified that when Jorge would see her around town he would "flip 
her off" and tell her that she was going to get what was coming to her. (Tr., p.340, L.2 -
p.342, L.3.) On February 9th , 2013, at 6:21 p.m., Jorge left a voice mail on 
Ms. Brennan's phone telling her exactly how he felt about the relationship. (Tr., p.330, 
L.2 - p.331, L.6; Ex. 34A.) In the voice mail, Mr. Alvarado stated, 
I thought you were smarter than that. I guess you're just another dumb 
little white bitch that fucking sucks dick for whatever. Um, yeah you're a 
piece a shit, bitch. And you tell your man that I'll fight with that 
motherfucker when I see him. Fuck him. Fuck his dad. Fuck everybody. 
He can go suck a fucking fat one. 
(Ex. 34A.) 
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Four or five minutes after leaving the voice mail for Ms. Brennan, Mr. Alvarado 
called his brother Robert Jimenez to tell him that he thought what Robert was doing was 
wrong. (Tr., p.162, Ls.1-6; p.191, Ls.13-23.) Mr. Alvarado testified that the two argued 
for three or four minutes before one of them hung up. (Tr., p.162, Ls.7-19.) According 
to Mr. Alvarado, Robert called him back 10 minutes later claiming that he broke a 
window and that he wasn't man enough to come over and deal with it. (Tr., p.162, L.20 
- p.163, L.22.) Although he claims he did not make any threats, Mr. Alvarado told 
Robert that he was going to go to his house, and he got in his truck and there 
(Tr., p.163, L.23-p.164, L.20.) 
Robert Jimenez testified that his relationship with his brother Jorge Alvarado 
began to deteriorate during the summer of 2012. (Tr., p.401, L.6 - p.405, L.15.) 
Mr. Jimenez testified that Jorge began drinking a lot and he never saw his brother 
sober. (Tr., p.406, L.12 - p.408, L.6.) Mr. Jimenez became concerned with the people 
Jorge was hanging out with. (Tr., p.408, L.7 - p.409, L.5.) At one point during that 
summer, Jorge tried to walk into Mr. Jimenez's then-wife's house and start a fight with 
Mr. Jimenez, but he would not do so. (Tr., p.410, L.14 - p.413, L.24.) On other 
occasions, Jorge drove by the same house slowly, with an angry stare. (Tr., p.424, L.4 
- p.425, L.16.) In January of 2013, Jorge and their brother Jose broke into Jimenez's 
house and stole his television. (Tr., p.426, L.5 - p.428, L.3.) Mr. Jimenez called the 
police about some these incidents but he was told there was nothing the police could 
do.3 (Tr., p.421, L.17 - p.428, L.9.) 
3 Mr. Jimenez also testified that during this time period, Mr. Alvarado tried to start a fight 
with a mutual friend, Manuel, whom Mr. Jimenez described as a "peaceful person," by 
slamming him into a wall. (Tr., p.419, L.13 - p.420, L.3.) 
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On February 9th, 2013, Mr. Jimenez was preparing to return from Jerome to his 
Twin Falls home when he received a short call from a drunk and angry Jorge. 
(Tr., p.429, L.1 - p.433, L9.) During this call, Jorge told Robert, "you're fucking dead, 
and you don't even know it You and your kids are fucking dead." (Tr., p.478, Ls.4-16.) 
Worried about what his brother might do, Robert obtained a gun from a friend while on 
his way home. (Tr., p.448, L.11 - p.449, L.7.) Robert received another call from Jorge 
while driving home, heard glass breaking in the background, and heard Jorge call him 
"Sponge Bob" and say that "[s]omebody's going to be pissed." (Tr., p.433, L. ·11 - p.434, 
L.5.) When Mr. Jimenez got home, he saw that a house window was broken out and, 
after checking to see if anyone was in the house, he called the police but was told he 
would have to go to the station and fill out a report. (Tr., p.436, L.3 - p.439, L 15.) 
After receiving separate calls from his sister and from Nicole Brennan, Robert called 
Jorge and confronted him about breaking the window. (Tr., p.439, L.16 - p.442, L.21.) 
Mr. Alvarado laughed at his brother and mocked him, but denied breaking the window. 
(Tr., p.442, Ls.2-21.) After phone conversations with various other people, Robert went 
to use the phone charger in his car. (Tr., p.442, L.25 - p.445, L.13.) 
Mr. Jimenez testified as he was connecting his phone to the charger, he saw 
Mr. Alvarado drive fast down his icy street and slam on the brakes stopping across the 
street; Robert grabbed the gun he had borrowed and he put it in his back pocket. 
(Tr., p.445, L.14 - p.449, L.15.) Robert testified that Jorge walked around his car with 
something in his hand, lifted his arm and stated, "you think you're fucking hard, don't 
you." (Tr., p.449, L.22 - p.450, L.13.) Robert testified that he panicked, asked his 
brother to put his gun down, and fired twice into the ground. (Tr., p.450, Ls.14-15.) 
Robert said that Jorge kept walking toward him and threatening him and, when Jorge 
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pointed a gun at Robert's head, Robert shot Jorge in the legs. (Tr., p.450, L.15 - p.451, 
L.1.) Mr. Jimenez testified that after Jorge threw the gun to the side, he shot his last 
bullet into the ground, and then went to call 911. (Tr., p.451, Ls.13-21; p.456, Ls.1-5.) 
Mr. Jimenez testified that he checked on his brother, who was trying to get up 
and leave, when one of his neighbors arrived. (Tr., p.457, L.11 - p.458, L.6.) While on 
the phone with the 911 operator, Robert took the gun inside his house and placed it on 
a chair under some pillows. (Tr., p.461, Ls.8-20, p.500, L.21 - p.501, L.10.) Even 
though he was injured, Jorge tried to attack the neighbor and continued to try and get 
up. (Tr., p.458, L.20 - p.459, L.11.) While Robert was still on the phone with 911, 
Jorge made his way to the cab of his truck and he started it up. (Tr., p.459, L.23 -
p.460, L 12.) Jorge then turned off the car and made his way to the back of the truck 
and sat on the tailgate until the police arrived. (Tr., p.460, Ls:12-16.) 
Mr. Alvarado testified to a different version of events. He stated that when he 
arrived at Robert's house he parked across the street, got out of his truck leaving his 
handgun in the center console, and Robert walked toward him and shot him twice 
without saying anything. (Tr., p.164, L.23 - p.170, L.19.) Mr. Alvarado testified that he 
tripped over the curb, fell backwards, and heard 3 or 4 more shots. (Tr., p.170, L.20 -
p.171, L.9.) He felt his left leg go numb. (Tr., p.171, Ls.10-13.) While his brother 
walked back towards the house, Jorge got up and hopped towards the cab of his truck, 
where he got his cell phone and called 911. (Tr., p.173, L.15 - p.175, L.3.) 
Mr. Alvarado then walked back and sat on his truck's tailgate until police and medical 
personnel arrived. (Tr., p.175, L.17 - p.176, L.4.) Mr. Jimenez testified that he had two 
bullet wounds to each leg and one to his lower back. (Tr., p.176, L.19-p.179, L.13.) 
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Eric Leal, a 19 year-old aspiring musician and acquaintance of Mr. Jimenez, 
arrived at Mr. Jimenez's house not long before Mr. Alvarado arrived, intending to talk to 
Mr. Jimenez about helping him record music. (Tr., p.548, L.18 - p.550, L.25.) 
Mr. Jimenez was flustered and said something about his house being broken into, and 
Mr. Leal saw that a window had been broken. (Tr., p.551, L.3 - p.552, L.15.) Mr. Leal 
saw Mr. Alvarado drive up, abruptly stop and get out of the truck holding a gun -
Mr. Leal started walking away because he did not want any trouble. (Tr., p.552, L.6 -
p.555, L.4.) As he was walking away, he heard arguing and someone said "put it down, 
don't do it, or something like that," then heard gunshots, and he ran away. (Tr., p.555, 
Ls.5-20.) 
Rhett Leavitt lived across the street from Mr. Jimenez and he heard what he 
thought at first were fireworks going off. (Tr., p.111, L.3 - p.114, L.24.) He looked out 
his window and, although it was pretty dark, he could see two people, one standing and 
one lying down. (Tr., p.115, Ls.15-25.) After the person who was standing walked 
away, the person lying on the ground made a throwing motion and then got up to get 
into his truck. (Tr., p.116, L.8 - p.117, L.4.) He saw that person crawl through the back 
door and get into the truck for about 20 to 30 seconds, and then walk around and sit on 
the tailgate. (Tr., p.117, Ls.5-13; p.122, L.25 - p.123, L.3.) Detective Lockwood 
searched both Mr. Jimenez's and a neighbor's front yard for a weapon but did not find 
anything. (Tr., p.271, Ls.18-21.) Mr. Alvarado's gun was found in its holster in the 
center console of his truck. (Tr., p.264, L.7 -266, L.17.) 
Mr. Jimenez said that he was scared and he lied to the 911 operator, and police 
officers, telling them that somebody else shot his brother. (Tr., p.451, L.20 - p.453, 
L.9.) He told Officer Dallan Hall and Officer Jayson Mickelson that he was inside his 
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house when he heard gun shots, went outside, and saw a male in a black hooded 
sweatshirt and black pants running away. (Tr., p.127, L.17--p.134, L.19; p.146, L.24-
p.149, L.17.) Mr. Jimenez continued with this story even after he was confronted by 
another officer who said Jorge accused Robert of shooting him. (Tr., p.134, L.23 -
p.137, L.13.) Detective Mittelstadt testified that he interviewed Robert on the night of 
the shooting and he gave varying accounts of what had transpired between he and 
Jorge both prior to and on that night, but that Robert eventually told him that Jorge had 
threatened he and his children and had pointed a gun at him, and Robert shot Jorge in 
self-defense. (Tr., p.363, L.9 - p.376, L.25.) 
The district court instructed the jury on the law relevant to their deliberations, 
including an instruction on seif-defense.4 (R., pp.200-218; Tr., p.597, L.14 - p.608, 
L.20.) During his closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly told the jury that they are 
the "reasonable person," and that they get to decide what a "reasonable person" would 
do. (Tr., p.610, L.21 - p.611, L.17; p.635, Ls.17-23.) The jury found Mr. Jimenez guilty 
of both counts, found that he used a firearm during the commission of the aggravated 
battery and, after part II of the trial, found that he was a persistent violator of the law. 
(R., pp.196, 198-199; Tr., p.669, L.20- p.687, L.3.) 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Jimenez filed a Motion for a New Trial based upon newly 
discovered evidence. (R., pp.253-256.) The motion was supported by an affidavit from 
Chad English who swore that he had a conversation with Jorge Alvarado after the trial 
in which Mr. Alvarado said '"yea I meant to kill that fool,"' in reference to his brother, and 
further stated that he '"stashed the gun"' after he was shot. (R., pp.255-256.) 
Mr. Jimenez submitted an additional affidavit in support of his motion from Michelle 
7 
McFarland, who swore that she had a conversation with Mr. Alvarado after the shooting 
but prior to trial, where Mr. Alvarado stated that Mr. Jimenez shot him "'because Robert 
knew I was 
denied Mr. 
over to beat his 
motion finding 
, pp.270-273.) istrict court 
newly discovered evidence, if presented 
the jury, would not probably have produced an acquittal. (Tr., p. 719, L.18 - p.722, 
L.13.) The district court sentenced Mr. Jimenez to a unified term of 28 years, with 8 
years fixed. 11-316; Tr., Ls.9-18.) Mr. a timely Notice of 
Appeal. (R., pp.320-322.) 




1. Did the district court lower the State's burden of proof by erroneously instructing 
the jury that in order for the battery to be justified as self-defense, Mr. Jimenez 
must have acted only in response to the danger presented, and not for any other 
motivation? 
2. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by misstating the law when he told the 
jurors that they set the "reasonable person" standard referred to in the self-
defense instruction? 
3. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Jimenez's motion for a new trial? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence of 





The District Court Lowered The State's Burden Of Proof By Erroneously Instructing The 
Jury That In Order For The Battery To Be Justified As Self-Defense, Mr. Jimenez Must 
Have Acted Only In Response To The Danger Presented, And Not For Any Other 
Motivation 
A. Introduction 
The district court instructed the jury that self-defense is only available where the 
defendant acted in response to the danger presented, and not for some other 
motivation. (R., pp.211-212.) Idaho law, however, does not preclude a defendant who 
uses force to prevent a battery on their person from acting for "some other motivation," 
provided they also act in response to the danger presented to them. Mr. Jimenez did 
not object to this instruction. However, he asserts that this instruction effectively 
lowered the State's burden of proof, thus violating his constitutional right to due process, 
the error is plain on the face of the record, and there is a reasonable possibility that the 
error affected the outcome of the trial. 
B. The District Court Erroneously Instructed The Jury That Mr. Jimenez Could Not 
Act In Self-Defense If He Was Motivated By Something In Addition To The Need 
To Meet The Danger Presented By Mr. Alvarado 
A trial court must instruct the jury on all matters of law pertinent to their 
considerations. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132). 
Appellate courts exercise free review over whether jury instructions correctly state the 
applicable law. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-588 (2011) (citation omitted). The 
instructions are reviewed as a whole, rather than individually, to determine whether the 
jury was adequately instructed. Id. at 588 (citation omitted). 
The district court provided the jury with instruction 13F which reads as follows: 
10 
A battery is justifiable if the defendant was acting in self-defense. 
In order to find that the defendant acted in self--defense, all of the following 
conditions must be found to have been in existence at the time of the striking: 
1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in imminent 
danger of bodily harm. 
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed that the 
action the defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from the danger 
presented. 
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable person, 
under similar circumstances, would have believed that the defendant was in 
imminent danger of bodily injury and believed that the action taken was 
necessary. 
4. The defendant must have acted only in response to that danger 
and not for some other motivation. 
5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the 
right of self-defense ends. 
In deciding upon the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs, you 
should determine what an ordinary and reasonable person might have concluded 
from all the facts and circumstances which the evidence shows existed at that 
time, and not with the benefit of hindsight 
The danger must have been present and imminent, or must have so 
appeared to a reasonable person under the circumstances. A bare fear of bodily 
injury is not sufficient to justify a battery. The defendant must have acted under 
the influence of fears that only a reasonable person would have had in a similar 
position. 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the battery was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the battery 
was justifiable, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
(R., pp.211-212 (emphasis added).)5 Idaho law, however, does not preclude the use of 
non-lethal force in self-defense where the defendant acts for "some other motivation," 
provided the defendant does in fact act in response to the danger presented. 
5 The instruction appears to be an amalgamation of two separate statutory frameworks 
for the law of self defense - one where the defendant uses non-lethal force and the 
11 
The right of self-defense has always been recognized in Idaho. Article I, § 1 of 
the Idaho Constitution reads as follows: 
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, 
among which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing 
safety. 
IDAHO CONST. Art.I, § 1 (emphasis added). This section, entitled "Inalienable rights of 
man," was so uncontroversial that it passed without debate during the Constitutional 
Convention. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
IDAHO 1889 (L.W. Hart, ed., 1912), p.128. 
This basic principle is recognized in Idaho statutory law as well. "Lawful 
resistance to the commission of a public offense may be made: 1. By the party about to 
be injured. 2. By other parties." LC. § 19-201. "Resistance sufficient to prevent the 
offense may be made by the party about to be injured: 1. To prevent an offense against 
his person, or his family, or some member thereof. 2. To prevent an illegal attempt by 
force to take or injure property in his lawful possession." I.C. § 19-202. Furthermore, 
No person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind 
whatsoever for protecting himself or his family by reasonable means 
necessary, or when coming to the aid of another whom he reasonably 
believes to be in imminent danger of or the victim of aggravated assault, 
robbery, rape, murder or other heinous crime. 
I.C. § 19-202A. Neither the Idaho Constitution nor Idaho statutes exclude the use of 
non-lethal force in self-defense where the person defending themselves may have an 
additional motivation to use force. 
In contrast, under some circumstances, the use of lethal force is not available 
where the person using such force is motivated by anything other than fear of bodily 
other where the defendant uses lethal force. See I .C. §§ 18-4009, 18-4010, 19-201, 19-
202, 19-203A, 19-203. 
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injury. "The law relevant to self-defense in a homicide case is I.C. § 18-4009." State v. 
Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 291 (1969). Idaho Code § 18-4009 describes four scenarios 
in which a homicide is justifiable. 
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in either of the 
following cases: 
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a 
felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person; or, 
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property or person, against 
one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to 
commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in 
a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another 
for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein; or, 
3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a wife or 
husband, parent, child, master, mistress or servant of such person, when 
there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to 
do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design being 
accomplished; but such person, or the person in whose behalf the defense 
was made, if he was the assailant or engaged in mortal combat, must 
really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle 
before the homicide was committed; or, 
4. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, 
to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully 
suppressing any riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace. 
I.C. § 18-4009 (emphasis added). By its plain language, the statute describes four 
separate scenarios in which a homicide may be justifiable. Id. Subsection (1) describes 
an actual, on-going attack. I.C. § 18-4009(1 ). Subsections (2) and (3) describe 
anticipated attacks against habitation, property or person. I.C. §§ 18-4009(2)-(3). 
Subjection (4) describes a scenario where a person is lawfully attempting to apprehend 
a felon, suppress a riot, or preserve the peace. I.C. § 18-4009(4). 
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Idaho Code § 18-4010 contains language indicating that the use of lethal force is 
not available where the defendant is not acting solely out of fear, but this applies only in 
the circumstances described in subsections (2) and (3) of I.C. § 18-4009. 
A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned in 
subdivisions 2 and 3 of the preceding section, to prevent which 
homicide may be lawfully committed, is not sufficient to justify it. But the 
circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable 
person, and the party killing must have acted under the influence of 
such fears alone. 
I.C. § 18-4010 (emphasis added). Thus, when reading these two provisions together, 
an individual faced with an anticipated attack on their person, may never use lethal 
force unless they are acting solely due to "the fears of a reasonable person." 
However, there is nothing in Idaho law that places this same limitation where the 
defendant uses non-lethal force. "The language of a statute should be given its plain, 
usual and ordinary meaning. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed 
intent of the legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory construction. 
The literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative intent." 
I.C. § 73-113(1 ). Idaho Code §§ 19-201, 19-202, 19-202A, and 19-203 provide that the 
use of a reasonable amount of non-lethal force may be used by a person who has a 
reasonable belief that they are in imminent danger of becoming a victim of a heinous 
crime but, unlike I.C. §§ 18-4009 and 18-4010, does not preclude the use of that force 
where the person may also be motivated by some other factor. See I.C. §§ 19-201-19-
203. Thus, under Idaho law, a person who otherwise meets the criteria for committing a 
battery in self-defense, cannot be held criminally liable if that person has an additional 
motivation. Instruction 13F misstates Idaho law. 
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C. The Erroneous Instruction Constitutes Fundamental Error Under The Facts Of 
This Case Requiring This Court To Vacate Mr. Jimenez's Conviction 
This Court may review un-objected to jury instructions under Idaho's fundamental 
error rule. State v. Adamcik, 152 !daho 445, 472-473 (2012) (citing State v. Johnson, 
145 Idaho 970 (2008)). 'The Perry fundamental error test requires the defendant to 
show three things: (1) the alleged error violated an unwaived constitutional right; (2) the 
alleged error plainly exists; and (3) the alleged error was not harmless." Id. at 473 
(citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 228). For the reasons stated below, Mr. Jimenez asserts that 
the district court's erroneous self-defense instruction meets the fundamental error 
standard requiring his conviction to be vacated. 
1. The Instruction Lowered The State's Burden Of Proof; Thus, The 
Instruction Violated Mr. Jimenez's Constitutional Right To Due Process Of 
Law 
A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is protected by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution. U.S CONST. 
amd XIV; lo. CONST art. 1 § 13. The Idaho Court of Appeals has observed, 
An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an 
element of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of 
due process, State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 
(2011); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 
(2007); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278, 113 S.Ct. 
2078, 2080-81, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 188-89 (1993); or as a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 
1, 12,119 S.Ct. 1827, 1835, 144 L.Ed.2d 35, 48-49 (1999); Sullivan, 508 
U.S. at 277-78, 113 S.Ct. at 2080-81, 124 L.Ed.2d at 187-88. 
State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012). In order to prove Mr. Jimenez 
committed the crime of aggravated battery, the State was required to prove the 
elements of the aggravated battery charge and prove that Mr. Jimenez's actions were 
not justifiable under Idaho law, i.e., that he was not acting in self-defense. The State 
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could meet the burden of proving Mr. Jimenez was not acting in self-defense if they 
disproved any of the 5 factors listed in the self-defense instruction. (See R., pp.211-212 
(providing, "In order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of the following 
conditions must be found to have been in existence at the time of the striking").) 
Allowing the State to disprove a fact that is not an element of self-defense is the 
equivalent of not requiring the State to disprove self-defense at all. For example, had 
the jury been instructed that in order for self-defense to apply, the aggravated battery 
must have been committed during the daytime, the State could negate Mr. Jimenez's 
self-defense claim simply by showing the battery occurred at night. Neither the time of 
day, nor the existence of additional possible motivations, negate the ability of a person 
to use non-lethal force in self-defense under Idaho law. The ability of the State to 
disprove Mr. Jimenez's self-defense claim, however, was lowered by Instruction 13F 
because the instruction required the jury to find Mr. Jimenez guilty if they found he was 
angry at his brother, even if the jury found that Mr. Jimenez use of non-lethal force was 
otherwise justified. Therefore, this instruction violated Mr. Jimenez's Constitutional right 
to Due Process of Law. 
2. The Instructional Error Is Plain On Its Face 
The instructional error in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to 
believe that Mr. Jimenez's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by failing to 
object to Instruction 13F. It appears that the district court simply took the jury 
instructions from Idaho's uniform criminal jury instructions. (Compare R., pp.211-212 
with I.C.J.I. 1517.) To the same extent that the district court could be excused for 
incorrectly relying upon the uniform criminal jury instructions, Mr. Jimenez asserts that 
his counsel should be excused for failing to object to these instructions. Regardless, 
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the errors in question are matters of law, not of fact, and are c!ear from the face of the 
record, and there is no basis to conclude that Mr. Jimenez's counsel knew the jury 
instruction at issue was incorrect but chose not to object. Therefore, the instructional 
error is plain on its face. 
3. The Instructional Error Is Not Harmless 
Because Mr. Jimenez did not object to the instruction during trial, he bears "the 
burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of 
the trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Mr. Jimenez asserts that there is a reasonable 
possibility that the instructional error affected the outcome of his trial. 
It is undisputed that Robert Jimenez and Jorge Alvarado did not get along. The 
jury heard evidence from both of them that they had not been on good terms for a long 
time and were arguing on the phone on the night of the incident, prior to the shooting. 
(Tr., p.162, L.7 - p.164, L.20; p.401, L.6 - p.433, L.9.) According to Mr. Jimenez, he 
received a call from Mr. Alvarado while driving home, heard glass breaking in the 
background, and heard Jorge called him "Sponge Bob" and told him that "[s]omebody's 
going to be pissed." (Tr., p.433, L.11 - p.434, L.5.) 
The State relied upon this evidence in arguing that Mr. Jimenez's actions were 
not justified by self-defense. The prosecutor argued, 
Now, but I have to touch upon those instructions, that these are my 
comments about instruction number 13-F. Now, in order to find Robert 
Jimenez acted in self-defense, that instruction tells you that all of these 
points, all these five things on that instruction have to be met ... And 
number four, the defendant Robert Jimenez, must have acted only in 
response to that danger and not for some other motivation. 
Well, what further motivation could there have been? Well, how 
about revenge or retaliation? His girlfriend and he had been harassed by 
the fact that they were in a relationship, that they'd been called names. 
Not only was his girlfriend but his dad and his kids were being 
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disrespected ... So was Robert trying to teach [J]orge, his younger brother 
a lesson? Didn't want to kill him, but he wanted to teach him a lesson that 
he cannot be disrespecting the family. Well, those are possible 
motivations along with maybe he was just simply mad or angry about 
being called Sponge Bob. I don't know. Sticks and stones will break your 
bones, but names won't hurt you, but apparently not with Robert. 
(Tr., p.635, L.2 - p.636, L.16.) The jury heard sufficient evidence to support the 
conclusion that Mr. Jimenez was acting in self-defense as defined by Idaho Code §§ 19-
201 19-203. (See Tr., p.400, L.16- p.534, L.12 (Mr. Jimenez's testimony).) Because 
the jury heard evidence of additional possible motivations for Mr. Jimenez to harm his 
brother such as anger or to teach him a lesson, and in light of the prosecutor's reliance 
upon that evidence in arguing against the jury finding Mr. Jimenez acted in self-defense, 
there is a reasonable possibility that the court's erroneous jury instruction affected the 
outcome of the trial. 
II. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Misstated The Law By Telling The 
Jurors That They Set The "Reasonable Person" Standard Referred To In The Self-
Defense Instruction 
A. Introduction 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly told the jurors that they 
were the community's barometer of the "reasonable person" referred to in the jury 
instruction on self-defense. By doing so, the prosecutor misstated the law effectively 
diminishing the State's burden of proving that the battery was not justified. Although 
Mr. Jimenez did not timely object to the prosecutor's statements, he asserts they 
amount to fundamental error and are not harmless. 
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B. The Prosecutor Misstated The Law By Ar ,uing That The Jurors Set The 
"Reasonable Person" Standard Articulated In The Self-Defense Instruction 
"The Idaho rule on self-defense ls not premised on a subjective test. It is 
grounded in the objective concept of the actions of a 'reasonable person."' State v. 
Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310, 313 (Ct App. 1984) (citation omitted). However, near the 
beginning of his closing argument, the prosecutor argued, in relevant part, as follows: 
This simply means that you don't check your common sense at the 
car and go in with a blank slate. You are allowed and encouraged under 
this instruction to use your everyday experiences and your common sense 
to decide what happened because you, the jury, are the community 
"reasonable person." When the instructions that you were read 
indicated what would a reasonable person do, well, you are the 
reasonable person. What would a reasonable person in the 
community do. 
Now instruction number 4 that you also got in the preliminary 
instructions told you that the State has the burden of proving the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And that I don't have to 
prove this case to an absolute certainty or beyond any mere possible or 
imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common sense. And 
so if you do come across any doubt, you have to ask yourself, is this doubt 
reasonable? And reason and common sense is going to be a constant 
theme in your deliberations, as I've said, that you are the community's 
barometer as to what is reasonable and what a reasonable person 
would do under the circumstances. 
(Tr., p.610, L.21 - p.612, L.17 (emphasis added).) Furthermore, in the context of 
arguing application of the evidence presented to the provided self-defense instruction, 
the prosecutor stated, "Number three, that - and this is where you get to interject your 
reason and common sense - number three, that a reasonable person under similar 
circumstances would have believed that he was in imminent danger of bodily injury and 
believed, that the reasonable person would have believed that shooting his brother was 
necessary." (Tr., p.635, Ls.17-23.) 
By telling the jurors that they represent the community's barometer of the 
"reasonable person" standard articulated in Jury Instruction 13F, the prosecutor in effect 
19 
told the jury that the "reasonable person" standard was pliable and subject to the 
individual preferences of the jurors. Because the reasonable person standard is an 
objective standard, and is not subject to the whims of individual jurors or a particular jury 
considering a particular case, the prosecutor misstated the law of self-defense 
applicable to Mr. Jimenez. 
C. The Prosecutor's Misconduct Constitutes Fundamental Error Under The Facts Of 
This Case Requiring This Court To Vacate Mr. Jimenez's Conviction 
Mr. Jimenez did not object to the prosecutor's false argument; however, he 
asserts that the prosecutor's argument amounts to fundamental error necessitating this 
court to vacate Mr. Jimenez's conviction. "Where prosecutorial misconduct was not 
objected to at trial, Idaho appellate courts may only order a reversal when the defendant 
demonstrates that the violation in question qualifies as fundamental error[.]" State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). "Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: 
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly 
exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); 
and (3) was not harmless." Id. at 228. 
1. By Arguing That The Jurors Could Apply Their Own Subjective View Of 
The Reasonable Person Standard, The Prosecutor Misstated The Law 
And Attempted To Secure A Guilty Verdict To The Aggravated Battery 
Charge By Improper Means Thus Violating Mr. Jimenez's Fourteenth 
Amendment Right To A Fair Trial 
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law 
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's 
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Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. A prosecutor 
commits misconduct during closing arguments by misstating the lmv and lowering the 
State's burden of proof. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86-86 (Ct, App. 2007) (citing 
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1992); State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 
168 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879,882 (Ct. App. 1988).) 
The "reasonable person" language is contained throughout the self-defense 
instruction used in Mr. Jimenez's case. Jury Instruction 13F reads, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
A battery is justifiable if the defendant was acting in self-defense. 
In order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of the 
following conditions must be found to have been in existence at the time of 
the striking: 
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable 
person, under similar circumstances, would have believed that the 
defendant was in imminent danger of bodily injury and believed that the 
action taken was necessary. 
5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of 
danger, the right of self-defense ends. 
In deciding upon the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs, 
you should determine what an ordinary and reasonable person might 
have concluded from all the facts and circumstances which the evidence 
shows existed at that time, and not with the benefit of hindsight 
The danger must have been present and imminent, or must have 
so appeared to a reasonable person under the circumstances. A bare 
fear of bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a battery. The defendant 
must have acted under the influence of fears that only a reasonable 
person would have had in a similar position. 
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the battery was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt 
whether the battery was justifiable, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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(R., pp.21 l-212 (emphasis added). 
The jurors are not, as the prosecutor argued, the ''community's barometer as to 
what is reasonable and what a reasonable person would do under the circumstances." 
(Tr., p.611, Ls.15-17.) However, by arguing that they were, the prosecutor essentially 
asked the jurors to place themselves in Mr. Jimenez's shoes and decide whether they 
would have done the same thing that he did. Idaho's self-defense law requires jurors to 
apply an objective standard when determining whether a "reasonable person" would 
conclude they were in danger and what a "reasonable person" would do to meet that 
danger. Idaho law does not allow jurors to second guess the actions of a defendant 
claiming self-defense, based upon their own subjective consideration of what they 
would have done if they were in that situation. 
The prosecutor's argument in this case is similar to the argument made by the 
prosecutor in State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679 (Ct. App. 2010), which the Court of 
Appeals found to be misconduct. The Erickson Court stated, 
In the present case, near the conclusion of his rebuttal closing 
argument, the prosecutor made the following statements: 
You set the standard for law enforcement. We look at these cases 
very carefully. What is the standard in Bear Lake County by a jury 
on what they're going to accept as proof of child molestation? 
That's all it's about. 
And if you're saying Mr. Helm, [L.H.], [C.E.], Officer Martinez, it's 
just not there, I've got to have more than this, we understand that, 
but there is also a downside to it. I can't bring you the perfect case. 
There will always be the possibility there. I bring you two people 
molested by their father at pretty much the same age. One gives 
credibility to the other. One collaborates [sic) the other. The pattern 
is similar. You as a juror are saying I don't believe either one of 
them. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I tell you this is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Justice demands that this father, this defendant, be 
convicted. 
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Erickson correctly asserts that the italicized portions of this 
argument were improper because they misrepresented and 
diminished the State's burden of proof. In suggesting that the jury 
should "set the standard" for the prosecutor and law enforcement in 
Bear Lake County "on what [a jury is] going to accept as proof of 
child molestation," the prosecutor invited the jury to create its own 
standard of proof instead of applying the reasonable doubt standard 
stated in its jury instructions. Then by stating "there is a downside" to 
finding the defendant not guilty because the prosecutor could never bring 
a "perfect case" for child molestation crimes, the prosecutor implied that 
the jury should find the evidence in Erickson's case sufficient to convict 
because it was the best the prosecutor could do. It also implied that if the 
jury did not convict in this case, the standard would be such that no one 
accused of this type of offense could be convicted. Because misstating 
the burden of proof deprives the defendant of a right essential to his 
defense and goes to the foundation of the case, this was 
fundamental error. 
Id. at 685-86 (emphasis added in bold). Just as the prosecutor in Erickson committed 
misconduct depriving the defendant of a right essential to his defense by inviting the jury 
to create their own standard of proof, the prosecutor in the present case committed 
misconduct by inviting the jury to create their own "reasonable person" standard, which 
deprived Mr. Jimenez of a right essential to his self-defense assertion. Therefore, the 
prosecutor's misconduct violated Mr. Jimenez's due process right to a fair trial. 
2. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Plain On Its Face 
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no 
reason to believe that Mr. Jimenez's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by 
failing to object to the prosecutor falsely telling the jurors that they set the "reasonable 
person" standard. The fact that the "reasonable person" standard is an objective 
standard is well-established. See State v. Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310, 313 (Ct. App. 
1984) (citation omitted). There is simply no strategic advantage that can possibly be 
gained by failing to object to, and to ask the court to correct, the prosecutor's 
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misstatement of the law applicable to the only disputed issue related to the aggravated 
battery charge. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face. 
3. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless 
Because Mr. Jimenez did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct during trial, 
he bears "the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected 
the outcome of the trial.n Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Mr. Jimenez asserts that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of his trial. 
It was dark on the street where the confrontation took place. (Tr., p.115, Ls.18-
19; p.120, Ls.7-8; p.130, Ls.3-9; p.165, L.24- p.166, L1; p.448, Ls.16-17; p.558, Ls.10-
22.) Robert Jimenez and Jorge Alvarado both brought guns to the confrontation. 
(Tr., p.169, L.25 - p.170, L.10; p.448, L.11 - p.449, L.7.) Mr. Alvarado's phone 
message to Nicole Brennan in which he said "tell your man that I'll fight with that 
motherfucker when I see him," a message left a short time before he drove to 
Mr. Jimenez's house, belies Mr. Alvarado's claim that he was not mad and just wanted 
to clear things up regarding the broken window. (Tr., p.198, Ls.4-24; Ex.34A.) 
While Mr. Alvarado testified that he left his gun in his center console, 
Mr. Jimenez and Mr. Leal both testified that he had it in his hand and raised it towards 
Mr. Alvarado, and Mr. Leavitt testified that he saw the person on the ground, 
undoubtedly Mr. Alvarado, make a "throwing motion." (Tr., p.115, L.24 - p.116, L.25; 
p.169, L.25 - p.170, L.1 O; 449, L.22 - p.450, L.15; p.552, L.6 - p.555, L.4.) 
Mr. Alvarado's gun was found in the center console of his vehicle in its holster, with no 
blood, snow or ice on it. (Tr., p.264, L.7 - p.266, L.17.) There was, however, a broken 
bottle of Crown Royal found between 20 and 25 feet away from Mr. Alvarado's truck. 
(Tr., p.385, Ls.3-22.) Mr. Jimenez told the jurors that in the months leading up to the 
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conflict, he never sa1;v his brother sober, and Mr. Alvarado admitted that he consumed 
alcohol before going to his brother's house. (Tr., p.199, Ls.21-25; p.406, L.12 - p.408, 
L.6.) 
The reasonableness of Mr. Jimenez's actions was the central issue for the jury to 
decide. Mr. Jimenez did not dispute that he shot his brother - he claimed that it was 
objectively reasonable for him to do so under the circumstances, pursuant to Idaho's 
non-lethal self-defense statutes. The jurors knew that Jorge had left an angry voice 
mail for Nicole Brennan specifically stating his intent to "fight with that motherfucker 
when I see him," and knew that Jorge was drinking. It is quite possible that the jurors 
did not believe Jorge's testimony that he was not mad at Robert when the confrontation 
occurred. It is also quite possible that the jurors believed that Mr. Alvarado had a bottle 
in his hand when he got out of his truck, and not a gun, considering not only 
Mr. Jimenez's and Mr. Leal's testimony, but also that of Mr. Leavitt, the neighbor who 
had no connection with either brother, and that Mr. Jimenez and Mr. Leal mistook the 
bottle for a gun in the darkness. Mr. Jimenez asserts that there is a reasonable 
possibility that, due to the prosecutor's misconduct, the jurors set their own standard for 
"reasonableness" and determined that, if they were in Mr. Jimenez's shoes, they would 
have made sure that the item Mr. Alvarado was holding was a gun, and not a bottle, 
before shooting. In sum, there is a reasonable possibility that the jurors used the wrong 
standard in determining whether Mr. Jimenez acted in self-defense, and a reasonable 
possibility that had they applied the correct objective standard, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct in this 
case was not harmless. 
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111. 
Mr. Jimenez's Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Jimenez's motion for new trial was based upon newly discovered evidence 
that .Jorge had told two different people that Robert shot him because Jorge was going 
to physically attack his brother. The district court found that the proffered evidence was 
newly discovered, found the failure to discover the evidence was not due to a lack of 
diligence, and found the proffered evidence to be material. The court, however, found 
that the proffered evidence would not probably have produced an acquittal because, 
even if the jury found that Mr. Alvarado was the initial aggressor and the shots to the 
legs were justified, the jury could still have found Mr. Jimenez's use of force was 
excessive because he shot his brother in the back. Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based on this finding. 
B Standard Of Review 
"'The denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."' 
State v. Ellington, 157 Idaho 480, 485 (2014) ( quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 
144 (2008). "Abuse of discretion review involves three questions: '(1) whether the lower 
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason."' Id. (quoting Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 133-34 (2008)). 
"Because a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence involves both 
factual and legal questions, '[a]n abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court's 
26 
findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or if the trial court does not 
correctly apply the law."' Id. (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 144.) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 34 grants the district court discretion to order a new trial if 
doing so is "in the interest of justice." i.C.R. 34. However, Idaho Code § 19-2406 sets 
forth the only grounds upon which a district court may grant a motion for a new trial. 
Ellington at 485 (quoting State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 675 (1997)). A court may grant 
a motion for a new trial "[w]hen new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, 
and which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at 
trial." I.C. § 19-2406(7). A defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence has the burden of showing: 
(1) that the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the 
defendant at the time of trial; (2) that the evidence is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (3) that it will probably produce an acquittal; 
and (4) that failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diiigence 
on the part of the defendant. 
Ellington at 485 (quoting State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691 (1976)). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Jimenez's Motion For A 
New Trial As The Court's Finding That Mr. Jimenez's Newly Discovered 
Evidence Would Not Probably Produce An Acquittal Is Not Supported By 
Substantial Evidence And Misapplies The Applicable Law 
Mr. Jimenez supported his motion for a new trial with two affidavits. (R., pp.253-
256, 270-273.) In the first affidavit, Chad English swore that in September of 2013, he 
had a conversation with Mr. Alvarado about the shooting and Mr. Alvarado stated, "'yea 
I meant to kill that fool'" and that he had '"stashed the gun"' that he was carrying that 
night. (R., pp.255-256.) In the second affidavit, Michelle McFarland stated that she had 
a conversation with Mr. Alvarado sometime between February 15 and March 15, 2013, 
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and in response to the question "'why would Robert shoot you?"' Mr. Alvarado stated, 
"'because Robert knew I was coming over to beat his ass."' (R., pp.272-273.) 
The court held a hearing on Mr. Jimenez's motion where the parties provided no 
further evidence. (Tr., p.698, Ls.6-22.) After hearing each party's arguments, the court 
orally pronounced its ruling. (Tr., p.698, L.25 - p.722, L.13.) The court held that the 
proffered evidence was newly discovered, could not have been discovered prior to trial 
through reasonable diligence, and was material. (Tr., p.714, L.24 - p.719, L.17.) 
Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district court's rulings on these factors were correct, and he 
does not challenge them in this appeal. 
The district court, however, found that Mr. Jimenez failed to meet his burden of 
showing that the evidence, if presented at trial, would probably produce an acquittal. 
(Tr., p.719, L.18-p.722, L.13.) The Court held, 
The jury certainly had evidence that they could have concluded, 
irrespective of the information in the affidavits of Mr. English and 
Ms. McFarland, that [J]orge, in fact, had a gun and that Mr. Jimenez was 
operating in self-defense when he shot back. All of that information was in 
this record, and I certainly agree with the defendant that the testimony of 
these two individuals would help support that finding. 
The other thing the jury could have concluded in this case, though, 
is that even if [J]orge had a gun, and they believed everything Mr. Jimenez 
said about the fear that he had and the fact that he saw [J]orge with the 
gun and so forth, the question is whether the number of times that he 
shot back at his brother was excessive, and again, it was undisputed 
that one of those shots was in [J]orge's back, which certainly would 
lead 12 people to conclude that's excessive force when somebody's 
running away from you, and you shoot them. So maybe they found 
the defendant guilty in this case because, A, they didn't believe the 
defendant's testimony and Mr. Leal's testimony that [J]orge had a gun, 
and that's understandable; or maybe they concluded that he was guilty 
because even though [J]orge had a gun, Mr. Jimenez used excessive 
force by shooting him in the back as he was retreating and thus 
negating the selfmdefense argument. I don't know. We have no way of 
knowing. 
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And that's the problem with this motion for new trial, because I 
cannot find that even with the presentation of the two testimonies from 
Mr. English and Ms. McFarland that that would probably produce an 
acquittal because the jury could have found either way, and if they found 
the second way, in other words, under the excessive force theory, their 
testimony really would not have made that much difference. 
(Tr., p.720, L.23 - p. 722, L.8 (emphasis added).) Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district 
court's finding is not supported by substantial evidence. 
While it is accurate to state that Robert Jimenez shot Jorge Alvarado in the back, 
it is not accurate to state, as the court apparently concluded, that Mr. Alvarado was 
running away when he was shot in the back. Mr. Alvarado testified that as Robert was 
walking towards him, Robert shot him twice, he tripped and fell over a curb, and Robert 
shot 3 or4 more times while Jorge was on the ground. (Tr., p.168, L.12-p.171, L.7.) 
Robert testified that he fired warning shots, and when Jorge continued to advance at 
him and point his own gun at Robert's head, Robert shot him in the legs to stop Jorge 
from shooting him, and he does not know how Jorge got shot in the back. (Tr., p.450, 
L.2 - p.451, L.13; p.495, L.20 - p.496, L.2.) There was simply no evidence to support 
the conclusion that Jorge was running away, or was in any way retreating, when he was 
shot in the back. If the jury believed that Jorge's testimony that he tripped over the curb 
after being shot in the legs, and also believed Robert and Mr. Leal's testimony that 
Jorge had a gun in his hand while doing so, there is no basis to conclude that the jury 
would have found that firing additional shots was excessive. 
Furthermore, Mr. Jimenez testified that there were two additional neighbors who 
were present on the night of the shooting, Jason (last name unknown to Mr. Jimenez), 
and Marty Anthony, but they refused to testify. (Tr., p.513, L.3 - p.514, L.25; p.519, 
Ls.18-24.) During its deliberations, the jury sent the court a note asking, "Can you 
subpoena someone in an aggravated battery case?" and "Can either the prosecution or 
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defense subpoena someone?" and the district court declined to answer the questions. 
(Tr., p.668, Ls.16-24; Court's Exhs.1-2.) While these questions cannot be deemed as 
definitive proof of why the jury rejected Mr. Jimenez's self-defense claim, the certainly 
support the notion that the jury was concerned about whether it was reasonable for 
Mr. Jimenez to shoot his brother in the first place, and not whether the shot to the back 
was excessive. 
Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district court's conclusion that the jury may have 
rejected the self-defense claim by finding the use of force to be excessive, rather than 
finding it was not justified at all, is not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, 
Mr. Jimenez asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for 
a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. 
IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence Of 28 
Years, With 8 Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case 
A. Introduction 
Although Mr. Jimenez maintains that his actions were legally justified as he was 
acting in self-defense, he asserts that, in light of the role Mr. Alvarado played in the 
confrontation that led to the shooting, the district court abused its sentencing discretion 
even assuming he was guilty of aggravated battery. 
B. In Light Of The Role Mr. Alvarado Played In The Confrontation, Mr. Jimenez 
Asserts That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive 
Sentence 
Mr. Jimenez asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 28 
years, with 8 years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
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sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Jimenez does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Jimenez must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141,145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001 )). 
Idaho Code § 19-2521 lays out the criteria the district court should consider in 
determining whether to place a defendant convicted of a crime on probation or send 
them to prison. I. C. § 19-2521. The Idaho Court of Appeals has concluded that even 
where a district court determines that a term of probation is not appropriate, the court 
may consider the factors listed in I.C. § 19-2521 in determining the appropriate length of 
the sentence. State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278 (Ct. App. 2002). Idaho Code § 19-
2521 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
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(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court, 
shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment: 
(c) The defendant acted under a strong provocation; 
(d) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the 
defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense; 
(e) The victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated the 
commission of the crime; 
I.C. § 19-2521(2)(c)-(e). 
Mr. Jimenez asserts that these factors are present in his case. Jorge Alvarado 
was drinking and was angry at his brother, leaving a voice mail on Nicole Brennan's 
phone stating his intention to "fight with that motherfucker when I see him." (Tr., p.199, 
Ls.2·1-25; Ex.34A.) Jorge claimed that he was innocent of any window breaking, yet he 
drove over to Robert's house with, at the very least, a gun readily available in the center 
console of his truck. (Tr., p.163, L.23 - p.164, L.20; p.169, L.25- p.170, L.10.) Robert 
did not seek out Jorge on the night of the shooting - Jorge sought out Robert. 
Mr. Jimenez asserts that, assuming but not conceding he was guilty of 
aggravated battery, he was acting under a strong provocation from Mr. Alvarado, there 
were substantial grounds tending to justify his conduct, and that Mr. Alvarado played a 
role in facilitating the shooting by driving to Robert's house with alcohol in his system 
and a gun in his possession, after threatening to fight Robert when he saw him. In light 
of the role Mr. Alvarado played in the incident that led to Mr. Jimenez's criminal 




For the reasons stated above, Mr. Jimenez respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings. 
Alternatively, Mr. Jimenez respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. 
DATED this 25th day of February, 2015. 
1 1 I / .. , f · I , , ', ,.. 
j • ./ / (j i/ 1<·~ 
JASQN C. PINTLE, 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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